Abstract: Water quality trading is a market-based alternative to command and control policies for nleetnig water quality goals. A trading program creates a market for pollution discharge reductions thr the purpose of achieving a water quality goal at a lower cost than traditional conunand-and-conrrol policies. The US Environmental Protection Agency and the USDA are promoting water qualit y trading in watersheds impaired by both point source and agricultural pollution. This research exanunes the extent to which water quality illipair_ nients have the potential for creating a demand for credits from agriculture. We found that the opportunities for the development of active markets between point sources and agriculture are limited, due primarily to lack of available demand from point sources. Out of 71() eight-digit H UCs containing waters impaired b y nutrients, we identified 142 and 224 where active markets for nitrogen and phosphorus credits, respectively, between regulated point sources and agriculture have the best opportunity to develop, assuming supply and demand impediments can be addressed through program design and government support. We use program data to account for current conservation measures on farms that could drive up the price of credits and reduce demand.
(Ticin \XLiter Act regulates point osirces (e.g.. factories, sewage treatment plants) through a pernnt system. The permit specifies how much of a particular pollutant the permit holder can discharge. (Concentrated anmial feeding operations are regulated as point sources under the Clean Water Act. However, the permit for concentrated animal feeding operations does not specify discharges but instead includes manageincur practices and structures to be used on the firni. Concentrated animal feeding operations would therefore not benefit from trading.) While fairl y easy to implement. the permit sy stem does not recognize differences in pollution control costs between regulated firms. Water quality trading uses market forces to allocate pollution control among uirnis so that total pollution control costs are i ii]nuiimzed (Tietenberg 2016) . Even though a gricultural pollution is not regulated under the Clean Water Act, the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) guidelines for water quality trading encourage states to consider agriculture as a source of marketable discharge reductions in water quality trading programs (USEPA 2004) .
The USDA is also very interested in water quality trading. In 2006, the USDA released a new department policy on market-based environmental stewardship (USDA 2006) . The goal of the policy is to broaden the use of markets for providing environmental arid ecosystem services through market mechanisnis, such as credit trading. Such markets could provide a source of income to farmers and could reward farmers for engaging in conservation activities. The USDA also entered into a partnership agreement with the USEPA to collaborate on efforts to establish viable water quality trading markets (USEIA 2006) .
Trading is organized around the creation Of a good called a discharge allowance, which allows the holder to discharge one unit of pollutant. Regulated dischargers can only discharge as much as their holding of allowances. Discharges in excess of the discharge allowances result in a fine or other penalties.
The total number of discharge allowances allocated to regulated dischargers is set b y the regulatory agenc y, based on the proportional contribution of the regulated pollutant to the total discharge limit for a watershed (a total liiaximuni daily load is often the basis for a water quality trading program). Discharge allowances are initially allocated to firills by auction or some other method.
Assuming that the number of allowances granted is less than baseline discharges, all firms face a choice. Firms with discharge levels greater than their initial holdings of allowances will have to either purchase more allowances or reduce discharges. Firms with iiiarginal costs of pollution control greater than the price of an allowance will purchase allowances in the niarket. Firms with marginal pollution control costs less than the price of an allowance will reduce discharges below their holdings of allowances and sell the excess allowances in the market. In equilibrium, the water quality goal is met (total discharges are no more than tile number of discharge allowances in the market), and those firms that can reduce discharges at the lowest cost provide most of the pollution control.
To enhance the economic performance of a water quality trading program arid to create an incentive for unregulated nonpoint sources such as agriculture to make a greater contribution to water quality,USEPA is encouraging the development of water quality trading progranis that include nonpoint sources as a source of discharge allowances (USEPA 2004) . Nonpoint source pollution is not regulated under the Clean Water Act, SO nonponit sources such as agriculture are not assigned a discharge cap ill a market. However, they can still produce pollutant reductions (referred to as credits) that point sources can purchase to meet their discharge quotas. Farmers can produce credits by altering input use, adopting conservation practices, and retiring cropland.
Point/nonpoint water quality trading markets must meet some basic conditions in order to develop and operate properly (Boyd and Banzhaf 2006; Bartfeld 1993) . Units of trade must be clearly defined, defensible ecologically and economisicahl and consistently commodity to he rrjdcd must be a single pollutant in a common form that is understood by niarket participants. There must be environmental equivalence between the discharge point of purchase and sale to ensure that expected water quality gains are achieved. Overall suppl y and demand must be reasonably aligned, ill there are enough potential credits in the market to satisfy the needs of potential purchasers. l'oint/nonpoint trading call work for pollutants that are produced by both point and nonpoit sources. Nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus) are the predonunant pollutants in the point/nonpoint niarkets that exist to date (Breet7 et al. 20(14) . Allowing point sources to purchase credits from nonpoint sources is believed to he beneficial to point sources because 6rrrners are widely expected to be able to reduce nutrient discharges at a lower cost than point sources (USEPA 2004) . Trading is also expected to he beneficial to farmers by providing an additional strearn of income. Unlike payments front conservation programs. the price of credits is not based on the cost of producing them, but on marker forces of supply and demand. For example, in the trading program established for Rahr Malting in Minnesota, four nonpomt source projects controlled phosphorus runoff at a cost of about $2.1 ((lb (Breetz et al. 2004) . Rahr Malting would have had to pay an estimated $4 to Si S lb phosphorus reduced if it had installed pollution control equipment instead. Rahr Making benefits by paying a lower price for phosphorus reduction, and farmers benefit from the additional incur ne. A farmer could therefore profit economically by selling credits to regulated point sources at a price that exceeds cost.
Another benefit of water quality trading is that it targets conservation resources to where they do the niost good. First of all. trading programs are created in watersheds that are unpaired and in need of improvemerit. Second, water quality trading markets autonlatically target investments within the watershed to where they are most efficient, in terms of expected water quality improvenients per dollar spent. Farmers who can reduce nonpoint source discharges at lowest cost are best able to compete for point sources' business. Targeting conservation progranis to where they do the most good has been a long staiidiiig concern of policy makers (US General Accounting Office 2007). Even though geographic targeting of sonic conservation programs such as the Cherry Creek, CO Lower Boise River, ID Piasa Creek, IL Environmental Quality Incentives Program was discouraged in the 21)1)2 farm act, targeting is still recognized as all tool for increasing the effectiveness of conservation spending (Soil and Water Conservation Society and Environrirerital Defense 201)7).
A relevant question is how important selling pollution reduction credits to point sources might be to farmers. If most mipaired watersheds could support point/ nonpoint trading markets, there might he less pressure to target conservation programs geographically, and the infusion of private sector resources fo r conservation would allow conservation programs to reach a wider group of farmers.
Unfortunately, curreiit experience with point/ nonpoint trading has not been promising. Forty water quality tradin g programs have been started in the United States since 1990 (Breetz et al. 2(04) . Fifteen include production agriculture as a potential source of credits for regulated point sources (table 1) . To date, trades between point sources and agricultural nonpoint sources have occurred in only three: Red Cedar River (Wisconsin), Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar. and Rahr Malting (Minnesota). Supply side and demand side impedniients seem to be preventing trades fioni occurring in most trading programs. These include uncertainty, over the number of discharge allowances for different management practices, difficulties in predicting pollutant reduction at the point in the watershed where the purchasing point source discharges, the reluctance of point sources to trade with unt'anuliar agents, and the perception of sonic farmers that enterbig contracts with regulated point sources leads to greater scrutiny and potential future regulation (King and Koch 2003; King 2005; Stephenson et al. 1998 ). Sonic of the steps taken by trading programs to address these issues include establishing trading ratios to account for uncertainty about practice effectiveness and location in the watershed (USEIA 2004 : CTIC 2006 , the use of models for estimating discharge allowances (USEPA 2004) , and urarket features such as clearinghouses or third-party brokers to reduce transactions costs (Breetz et al. 2004: Woodward and Kaiser 2002) .
A factor that may have all bearing on point sources' demand for farmerprovided discharge allowances is the level of nutrient control being implemented at the tinie a trading program is created. Most trading progranis set a baseline based on pre-prograni farming practices (Breetz et al. 20(14) . 11'a farmer has already iniplernented a nutrient nianageinent plan additional reductions in nutrient hiss will likel y cost niore per-unit than the reductions achieved by the nutrient management plan. Marginal costs of pollution control are increasing for most if not all industries. If nutrient management is widely practiced in a watershed under a new point/nonpoint trading program, the average price of farmer-provided discharge allowance may be high enough 201)2). An area that has not been well researched is the extent to which point sources can become a major source of conservation funding if and when impediments to market formation are overcome. While many factors may hinder market performance, research and experience are likely to remove many existing impediments currently affecting trading programs.
In this paper we assess the potential for water quality trading programs to provide finners with financial incentives for improving water quality through reductions in nutrient loadings. This study addresses two issues relevant to USDA's policy initiatives:
(1) The number of impaired watersheds where the supply of credits from agriculture and the demand for credits by point sources are conducive to formation of an active market for nutrient reductions. (2) The degree to which previous federal conservation program outlays to support better stewardship on farms might affect the potential supply of credits.
Materials and Methods
We used a simple screening procedure to identify watersheds where viable water quality trading markets with agricultural participants are most likel y to develop, assuming that impediments to trading can he addressed through research and policy design.The very few examples of watersheds where point/ nonpoint trades have occurred precludes any kind of statistical anal ysis to identify significant factors related to successful trades. Instead we developed a series of indicators based on those characteristics that are likely to lead to a level of demand for agricultural credits that is high relative to the total contribution of agricultural pollution loadins.The Procedure takes into account three important factors critical for the formation of a Water quality trading market: I Water quality impairment by a poilLitant is produced b y both regulated point sources and agriculture. 2. Point soLirces and agriculture both contribute enough of the pollutant to generate an ''active" market (demand and supply are in balance).
3. The degree to which farmers have already adopted management practices that might limit their ability to provide low-cost pollution abatement.
The stud y area comprises the 2,111 eight_ digit hydrologic unit codes (HUC) of the contiguous 48 states. We used eight-digit HUCs because water quality trading prograins tend to he limited in geographic scope by the requirement that credits be calculated at the point where a point source discharges into the unpaired water body and because the data we needed were available at this scale. Current water quality trading programs tend to be smaller than eight-digit HUCs.
The first step was to idcntiffy those HUCs that contain surface waters inspaired by nutrients. Under section 303(d) oF the Clean Water Act, states, territories, and authorized tribes are required to develop lists of impaired waters (USEPA 2007). Impaired waters do not meet the water qualit y that states, territories, and tribes have set for them, even if regulated point sources have installed the munnium required levels of pollution control. We used the USEPA's 303(d) list of impaired waters to identify HUCs containmg nutrient-impaired stream segments. As of 2007, a total of 5,664 stream segments were identified as unpaired by either nitrogen or phosphorus.
The second step was to identif y those HUGs \vhlere there is the likelihood of a high volume of trades relative to agriculture's loadings. We determined this b y using estimates of nutrient loadings from point Sources and agriculture. The US Geological Survey provided estimates of annual nutrient loadings from point sources, agricultural nonpoint sources (cropland and manure), and other ilonpoint sources (urban runofI in each eight-digit HUG (Smith et al. 2000) . These estimates, in kilograms of N or P per year, were derived with a national application of the Spatially Referenced Regressions on Watershed Attributes model. Spatially Referenced Regressions on Watershed Attributes is watershed modeling technique for relating in-stream water-quality measurements from a network of about 400 monitoring stations to attributes of the watersheds containing the stations (Smith et al. 1997) . It is a hybrid statistical /deter iii nistic approach that uses a regression equation to correlate measured stream nutrient flux with spatial data on sources, landscape characteristics (e.g., soil permeability, temperature), and stream properties (e.g., flow, water time of travel). The model separately estimates the quantities of nutrients delivered to streams and the outlets of watersheds from point and nonponit sources.
Data for nutrient sources were developed for five source categories: municipal and industrial point sources, commercial fertilizer. animal agriculture, nonagricultural runoff, and atmospheric deposition. Data for point sources were from USEPA permit information. Watershed inputs of fertilizer were based on fertilizer sales data. Watershed nutrient inputs for animal agriculture were based on surveys of animal numbers and published manure nutrient coefficients. Nitrogen contributions from ii leguminous crop fixation were assumed to he reflected iii the estimated coefficient for the fertilizer source category. Atmospheric deposition sources were based on measured inputs of wet nitrate deposition. Details of the model can be found in Smith et al. (I 997) .The estimated loadings for each HUG were based on data from the 1980s. We assumed that the proportion of loadings fi-om each source (point and nonpoint) has not changed.
Spatially Referenced Regressions on Watershed Attributes data indicated that agricultural sources contributed 54% of nitrogen loadings nationally and 58% of phosphorus loaduigs. Point sources contributed onl y 7% of nitrogen loadings and 20% of phosphorus loadin gs (Smith et al. 2000) . However, relative contributions vary widely across watersheds, with uuplications for supply and demand conditions that favor successful water quality trading markets.
Whether an "active" trading market can develop that also provides agriculture with enough incentive to significantly address pollutant loadings depends on the relative loadings by different sources. If point sources predominate, then agricultural sources would not be able to satis,' the point sources' needs. and point sources would trade among themselves. If agricultural loadings (from cropland and animal waste) predominate then point sources would he unable to provide enough financial resources to significantly reduce nonpoint source pollution on farms. A Percent of ag contribution to N loadings L factor we had to account for is that the USEPA often requires a trading ratio greater than 2 to I for point sources (USEPA 2(1)4: Breetz et al. 20(14) . This means that point sources are required to purchase more tiun one agricultural credit to replace one unit of their own discharge. We chose to identi0' those HUGs where between 50% and 9i of loadings were from agriculture. This range provides enough potential credits from agoculture when such a trading ratio is in place and enough demand front point sources to potentially reduce a significant aillount of agricultural pollution.
The third step was to estimate the degicc to which nutrient managenient was alrc;ijv being implemented on cropland in a HL(I. The greater the baseline level of adoption, the uiore costly it will be for farnn to provide additional reductions in nutrient loadings. We focused on the use of USDAdefined nutrient management plans (NMPs) as a practice for reducing nutrient loss from fields. The USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRGS) defines nutrient management as nlanagmg the amount, source, placenient, form and Imung of the application of nutrient and soil amendments (USDA NRCS 1999). A nutrient management plan specifies the form, source, amount, timing, and method of application of nutrients on each field to achieve realistic production goals, while minimizing nutrient movement to surface and/or ground water. A NMP therefore includes manageuient practices such as cover crops, reduced tillage, buffers, and other measures as needed to reduce the movement of nutrients off the field.
We obtained data on the amount of cropland covered by a NMP implemented with any assistance froiii USDA. in each HUC meeting the loadings criteria, from USDA's NRCS Performance Results System (USDA NRCS 2007). The Performance Results System sumnumarizes time extent of practice adoption on a land unit basis, by all farmers who ask for conservation planning assistance front USDA. We summed the acres put under a NMI' iii the years 2004 through 21)1(6. Data from earlier years were not available. The actual adoption of nutrient management is therefore greater than our estiniates. but survey data from the Economic Research Service indicate that overall adoption of NM l' prior to 2(1(14 Was lU t ft low (Ribaudo and Johansson 21)07). 
Results and Discussion
The waters identified in the 303(d) data as impaired by nutrients (either nitrogen or phosphorus) are contained in 71)) Fl tiCs (figure 1). All the existing point/nonpomt trading programs listed in table I fall in these unpaired HUCs.
In most impaired HUGs, active trading is not likely because of the predominance of nonpoint source nutrient loadings froii i agriculture-that ls,a relatively low demand for credits from point sources relative to the potential number of credits. For example, 70% of the 71) unpaired FIUCs, agriculture accounts for over 90% of nitrogen loadings (figure 2). Similarly. in 54% of impaired HUGs, agriculture accounts for over 90% of phosphorus loadings (figure 3). in these F-luCs, point sources should he able to easily meet their permit requirements by purchasing fronu agriculture, but overall, nonpoint source pollution from agriculture will not be reduced much.
A relativel y small percentage of unpaired HUGs had potential demand for credits that were likely to be balanced with potential supply. Of the impaired HUCs. 142 (20%) and 224 (32%) had nitrogen and phosphorus loadings from agriculture ranging between 50% and 90%, respectively (figures 4 and 5). The watersheds where active phosphorus trading is deenied most likely contain about 322.000 farms (15% of all US farms), and those where active nitrogen trading is deenied most likely contain about 175,000 (8% of all farms) (USDA NASS 2002). These watersheds are scattered throughout the COL111trv, but most are located east of the M issisuppi River, pruuarily around the Great Lakes and in the Northeast. While a large number of Grins are located in these watersheds, they represent a sniall percentage of all farms. Even if active trading occurs in each of these watersheds, the overall contribution to pollution reduction from a national perspective is hinited.
The potential price of credits from agriculture is affected by the level of nutrient management that is part of the baseline (from which the number of ilLitrient credits would be calculated). Nutrient credits from a farni that is already taking steps to manage excess nutrients are likely to be more expensive than those froni a Grni that is not. Therefore, a watershed with a higher percentage of cropland already under a NMI) Will generally provide nutrient reduction
Figure 5
Impaired eight-digit hydrologic unit codes (HUCs) where phosphorus credit trading is most likely to occur, with two levels of nutrient management plan adoption.
Impaired watersheds where demand and Supply of P credits are most likely to be in balance (224 watersheds):
Lii Greatest availability of low cost credits (<5% cropland acres under NMP) IIIIIIIIIN Somewhat lower availability of low cost credits (5-25% cropland acres under NMP)
Note: of these 224 watersheds, none have >25% of cropland acres under NMP.
Credits at a higher cost than a snniLsr watershed \vitl i a sn ijller level of NM P adoption. potentially decreasing the volurie of trades between point sources and agriculture in higher cost watersheds. The data oil front indicates that no unpaired HUG with between 50% and 90% of loadings front agriculture had more than 22% of its cropland under a NMP at the end of 2006, and most had less than 5% (90% for N-inipaired I-JUGs and 57% for P-unpaired HUCs)(tigures 4 and 5). This suggests that the curreimt level of NMP adoption, which would raise the average cost of potential credits front is not a hunting factor-to market development and activity.
Summary and Conclusions
In theor y, \v,ltcr quality trading niarkets can be beneficial to thrniers and to USDA coilservation prograiiis. While water quality benefits ma y be reaped in watersheds where markets are inpleinented, front a national viewpoint, point/ nonpoint water quality trading would likely have onl y lnmtcd impact oil quality unprovenient overall. Even if market inipedinients can be addressed, relatively few inipaired watersheds are in "balance," such that the potential demand for nonpoint source credits is high enough to spur an active" market with nonpomnt sourcev Also, while credit trading could occur in ally watershed where point sources are required to reduce nutrient loadings and are allowed to ofliet their discharges with discharge reduction from firms, the overwhelmuig contribution of agricultural discharges in niost unpaired watersheds will limit the formation of vigorous markets that direct significant financial resources toward water quality-in iproving nianagenient practices. It is unlikely that this conclusion would change if we based our analysis oil larger than eight-digit HUGs. The preponderance of nionpoint source discharges relative to point discharges is also seen at these larger scales.
While point/nonpoint credit trading niay represent all source of conservation funding in sonic local areas, USDA will most likely remain the prunary source of assistance for reducing water quality inipairinents generated by farms. Point sources are likely to be able to nieet their discharge quotas by purchasing onl y a fraction of potential nonpoiit source reductions from thriiis.
This analysis provides only a first cut of where point-rionponit trading nn-ht make a significant contribution to reducing agricultural iionpoint source pollution. Ultimately, whether trading occurs and at what level will depend on the loading caps set by government (to stimulate demand), and the steps taken to overcome the substantial transactions costs that characterize current trading programs.
Disclaimer
The eject ,-x 1,isssed I it this paper tie those Of the author, lull sit, HIlt nc,coarilv Tell ct_I tli,e of the Economic FCcsc,ircii Sees ecu, Ehv US] )A.
